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countries. Many non-tariff barriers still also impede agricultural trade. This paper presents the 
theoretical foundations of a gravity model to explain trade flows of both primary agricultural 
commodities and processed foods. At the consumer level, commodities are differentiated 
according to their country of origin while primary agricultural goods are homogenous from the 
buyers’ perspective. However, primary goods can not be substituted costlessly across 
destinations from the sellers’ perspective due to differences in technical and sanitary regulations 
between countries. These assumptions yield well-behaved import demand functions at the 
consumer level and export supply functions at the producer level. Imperfect substitutability at the 
consumption and production levels is summarized in two important structural parameters. The 
role of these parameters in explaining bilateral trade patterns is illustrated for a three-country 
world market using a numerical example. The simulation investigates whether it is more 
important for a small open economy that large policy active countries reduce agricultural tariffs 
or domestic support. It also addresses the implications of tariff escalation on trade flows.    
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Domestic Support and Tariff Reductions in the Presence of Non-Tariff Barriers:  
A Gravity Model for Primary and Processed Agricultural Products 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite broad globalization pressures, import tariffs in agricultural and food industries remain 
particularly high compared to the industrial sector. The Organisation for Economic and Co-
operation Development (OECD) estimated that the average tariff for agricultural and agri-food 
products in OECD countries was 36 % in 2003, whereas it was 63 % for a sample of non-OECD 
countries (OECD, 2004). In comparison, successive rounds of negotiations that begun in the 
1940s managed to reduce tariffs on industrial products from an average of 40 % after the Second 
World War to nearly 4 % (OECD, 2003). Unfortunately, the lessons from this spectacular 
exercise in trade liberalization have not inspired WTO members to pursue a path of rapid trade 
liberalization for agricultural products. In spite of the tariffication process undertaken in the 
Uruguay Round, non-tariff barriers (NTB) remain important impediments to agri-food trade 
(UNCTAD, 2005). Furthermore, several countries support agriculture with production subsidies 
and supply controls. On the positive side, the potential trade-distorting effect of domestic 
subsidies was recognized in the Uruguay Round and as a result ceilings are imposed on coupled 
support (i.e. subsidies that are tied to current production). The OECD estimated that the support 
granted to agricultural producers represented 32 % of total agricultural receipts in 2003 and the 
share of trade-distorting support represented approximately 75 % of total support (OECD, 2004).  
Despite the existing level of border protection and the fact that the multilateral 
negotiations of the Doha Round are currently stalled, there are signs that protectionism in 
agriculture will not resist indefinitely to broad globalization forces. Some headway has been 
achieved in certain areas, like the gradual elimination of export subsidies, the adoption of four 
bands to structure tariff cuts, and the transformation of specific tariffs into ad valorem 
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equivalents (WTO, 2005). Tariff and domestic support reductions have different effects on the 
volume of trade and welfare, even in the simplest settings. In order to best exploit the modest 
efforts of WTO members to liberalize agriculture, it is crucial to develop a thorough 
understanding of the implications of tariff and domestic support reductions in the presence of 
non-tariff barriers for both primary commodities and processed agricultural products. Primary 
and processed products are linked in production and as such policies aimed to influence one will 
also have an incidence on the other. However, primary and processed agricultural products are 
often taxed at very different rates. Tariff escalation is a fairly common phenomenon. In short, it 
is not obvious which of tariff reductions and domestic support reductions have the biggest 
welfare impacts and hence which should be singled out for more intense negotiations by WTO 
members.      
The objective of the paper is to develop a framework to analyze the impacts of tariff and 
domestic support reductions stemming from multilateral and regional agreements in the presence 
of non-tariff barriers on the volume of trade of primary and processed agricultural products. To 
our knowledge, there are no theoretical trade models that have accounted for both non-tariff 
barriers and vertical linkages between primary and processed agricultural products. Our 
theoretical model builds on the gravity1 model of Lai and Trefler (2004) and it has the advantage 
of generating predictions amenable to empirical testing. Gravity models may have different 
theoretical foundations and hence different specifications (Evenett and Keller, 2002).  We posit 
that trade flows are conditioned by bilateral trade costs and some country-specific productivity 
shocks. We rely on numerical simulations to illustrate the impacts of tariff and/or domestic 
support reductions on the volume of trade and prices.  
There exists a considerable literature on the estimation of welfare gains resulting from 
trade liberalization in agricultural trade. The bulk of the efforts involve large-scale Computable 
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General Equilibrium (CGE) models.2 While these models are able to generate detailed 
predictions about output, factor prices and factor allocation across sectors, they are often 
calibrated at a particular point in time and rely on parameters borrowed from other studies.3 In 
contrast, our model can be econometrically estimated to generate parameters that are consistent 
with one another and rigorous statistical inference about various hypotheses can be conducted.4  
However, such an endeavour is beyond the scope of the current paper.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section sets the foundations 
of the gravity based trade model in a partial equilibrium framework. Comparative static effects 
of unilateral liberalization are presented in the third section and contrasted with the usual 
textbook results. The fourth section introduces a three-country world market structure to 
underline the importance of non-tariff barriers in the assessment of the welfare consequences of 
trade liberalization. Specifically, it analyzes whether it is more important for a small open 
economy to have partners reduce tariffs or domestic support. The final section presents the 
potential implications of the theoretical model for empirical purposes.  
 
2. The Model 
The theoretical framework must be able to identify the separate effects of domestic support, tariff 
barriers and geographic variables such as trade costs in the determination of bilateral trade 
patterns. To account for trade in primary agricultural commodities, the monopolistic competition 
model of Lai and Trefler (2004) is augmented with the introduction of supply-side rigidities 
along the lines of Geraci and Prewo (1982) and Bergstrand (1985). Processed goods are 
differentiated according to their country of origin and the number of varieties supplied by each 
country is fixed. We appeal to the well known Armington assumption that posits that imports and 
domestic goods are imperfect substitutes for one another (Armington, 1969). Primary goods are 
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assumed to be homogenous products and hence perfectly substitutable across origins from the 
processing firms’ perspective. However, it is assumed that destinations cannot be substituted 
perfectly from the exporters’ perspective due to non-tariff barriers. This assumption is captured 
by a constant-elasticity-of-transformation (CET) cost function. Finally, coupled domestic support 
is introduced in the supply decisions of agricultural producers. 
Suppose there are 1, ,i N= …  countries in which consumers have identical preferences 
over G goods. There are gjN  varieties of good g ( 1, ,g G= … ) produced in country j 
( 1, ,j N= … ). Consumers’ preferences in each country are summarized by Cobb-Douglas 
preferences over goods and a CES type utility function over varieties. Let ( )gijq ω  be country i’s 
consumption of good g produced in country j with ω  indexing varieties. Let the parameter 
1gη >  measure the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The utility function is: 
1
gG
i gig
U U α== ∏  with:  
( )( ) ( )1 1
0
g
g ggj
g
N
gi gijj
U q d
η
η η
ηω ω
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∫         (1) 
Under the assumption of monopolistic competition in the production of processed goods 
and constant average variable costs, profit maximization implies:  
( ) 11gj g g gjp cη η −= −           (2) 
where gjp  is the price received by firms in country j, and gjc  is the constant marginal cost of 
production for good g in country j.  
From the consumers’ standpoint, two-stage budgeting allows to compute conditional 
expenditures on individual varieties in terms of hypothetical expenditure allocations across 
goods. Using (2), country i's demand function for the variety of good  g supplied by country j is:  
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where iY  is aggregate income in country i, and 1gijτ ≥  represents trade costs (tariffs, 
transportation, etc.) associated with shipping good g to location i from country j. For the time 
being, it is assumed that income is exogenous. Imports in country i are equal to the aggregate 
consumption of each variety multiplied by the number of variety: 
( ) ( )
( )1
1 g
g
g gij gj gj
gij gj gij g i
g gik gk gkk
c N
M N q Y
c N
η
η
η τα η τ
−
−
−= = ∑       (4) 
In the above framework, processed commodities, like cheese and pork meat, are 
differentiated from the consumers’ perspective. Primary products, like milk and hogs, are usually 
considered homogenous goods. This assumption is far from being heroic and it is analytically 
convenient. Allowing primary products to be differentiated would dramatically exacerbate the 
dimensionality of the model because of the vertical linkages between primary and processed 
goods.   
The premise in what follows is that although primary products are homogeneous, they are 
not likely to be freely substituted between foreign markets from the exporting country’s 
perspective. Many of the reasons motivating the imperfect substitutability of primary agricultural 
products across destinations revolve around non-tariff barriers. For example, agricultural 
products often need to meet sanitary or packaging criteria that can differ across importing 
countries. It could be also that importers have particular demands in terms of currency invoicing 
and delivery terms that discourage destination switching.5  
Let us assume that the production function of the agricultural good is homothetic and that 
the cost function of a representative producer of primary product g in country j is: 
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( ) ; 1gj j gjI βφ β >w ; where gjI  denotes country j’s production of primary goods, ( )φ ⋅  is a sub-cost 
function and w  is a vector of input prices. Following Geraci and Prewo (1982), Bergstrand 
(1985) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001), the aggregate output of the primary good is: 
( ) (1 )(1 )1 g gg ggj gijiI I ++== ∑ γ γγ γ  where gγ  is the constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
developed by Powell and Gruen (1968) to analyze agricultural supply. If gγ  is zero, primary 
products cannot be substituted across destinations while a value of infinity would imply that 
products can be freely substituted. A distinguishing feature of our framework relative to the ones 
in the aforementioned literature is that we interpret the CET function as a cost function and not 
simply as an aggregator function.6 As mentioned by Baier and Bergstrand (2001), the parameter 
gγ  provides an analytically and empirically tractable means of letting the data determine the 
degree of substitutability between markets. Note that the parameter is indexed by g thus 
suggesting that substitution across destinations may be easier to achieve for certain commodities 
than others.  
Profits are defined as:  
( )1 gi gij gij gij gj j gji h s t I I βπ φ== −∑ w         (5) 
where 1gijs ≥  is the production subsidy equivalent in the production of primary good g offered 
by country j and 1gijt ≤  measures the bilateral trade costs for the primary product.7  Note that the 
production subsidy offered in country j is also indexed according to the destination of the 
primary product. In theory, domestic support should not be conditional on the ultimate 
destination of the product, but introducing this notation serves however two purposes. First, the 
subsidy equivalent is measured as a percentage of the domestic price in destination i and 
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domestic prices vary across destinations. Second, the variable gijs  can be adjusted to account for 
both export and production subsidies. 
As apparent from the previous profit definition, sale revenues in market i are derived 
from the price received in market i plus the support offered by country j minus the transaction 
cost of shipping the product from j to i. Note that the notion of homogeneity among primary 
goods is supported by the condition that the price received in market i is independent from the 
origin of the product. However, goods are not homogenous in a “pure” sense because they 
cannot be freely substituted across destinations from the producing region’s perspective. Hence, 
the rigidity in trade originates from the technological side and, as a result, there is no arbitrage 
condition between prices of primary good g in any given market (e.g., gjh ≠  gkh ).  
Consider the profit maximization problem of a representative primary producer in 
country j. Profit maximization yields the following set of first-order conditions: 
( )( )( )( 1) 1 (1 )(1 ) 11 0; 1, ,g gg g ggi gij gij gj j gij giji
gij
h s t I I i N
I
βπ βφ − − ++=∂ = − = ∀ =∂ ∑w …
γ γγ γ γ     
 At the profit maximization solution, we find: ( ) ggij gkj gi gij gk gkjI I h t h t= γ . Solving the full 
system of first order conditions yields the bilateral export supply equations: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
1/ 11 1
1 1 1 11
1
g
g gg
gi gij gij
gij gj
gi gij giji
h s t
I
h s t
γ
γ γγ
w ββ β ββ φ
− −− −
− − + −+
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
   (6) 
The following assumptions are made to facilitate the interpretation of the subsequent 
comparative static exercise.  
 
Assumption 1: ( )1 1gγ β> − .   
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This inequality states that destinations can be substituted relatively freely (low non-tariff 
barriers) only if returns to scale are sufficiently decreasing (as measured by the parameter β ). 
This insures that the export supply function from country j to destination i is increasing in the 
price ( )gih  paid in market i  ( 0gij giI h∂ ∂ >  for j i≠ ) and decreasing in prices observed in other 
destinations.  
 
Assumption 2: gij gi gij gjI h I h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  and gij gj gij giM h M h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ .   
 
The above assumption stipulates that for the primary and the processed goods, own-price effects 
dominate cross-price effects. From assumption 2 and the functional forms in (4) and (6), it can be 
shown that : gij gij gij giiI s I s∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ , gij gij gij gkjI t I t∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  and gij gij gij gkjM Mτ τ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ .  
Assuming that one unit of primary good is required to produce one unit of processed 
good, the market clearing conditions restrict country k’s total purchase of primary goods to be 
equal to its shipments of the final good to all destinations:  
1 1gkj gikj i
I M g= == ∀∑ ∑          (7) 
In all, there are N equilibrium conditions that solve for the primary good prices in N countries. 
 
3. Comparative static for the two-country case 
A two-country example is presented to investigate the properties of the model and provide a first 
look at potential trade liberalization effects following changes in tariffs and domestic subsidies 
for different levels of non-tariff barriers. We adopt a two-country partial equilibrium structure to 
more easily delineate the implications of vertical linkages. Given that preferences are weakly 
separable, substitution effects between any two products in different groups are function of the 
income effect. Because income is held fixed in partial equilibrium, there can be no cross-price 
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effects following a change in a policy parameter. Accordingly, the comparative static focuses on 
a single sector. We can set incomes in both countries such that 1 2 1Y Y= = , treat input prices 
(such as labour and capital) as exogenous and normalize the sub-cost function ( )φ w  to one.   
We rule out corner solutions to focus on the implications of “bilateral dumping” in primary and 
processed goods. As such, each country produces the primary good and consumes part of it and 
exports the rest. The same can be said about processed goods. As will soon become evident, the 
analysis is quite complicated in spite of all the simplifying assumptions. 
The market clearing conditions are: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 11 21 11 12
2 22 12 22 21
: 0
: 0
g g g g
g g g g
CC M M I I
CC M M I I
+ − + =
+ − + =        (8) 
Differentiating the system in (8) with respect to the two endogenous variables (the primary price 
in each country) and the tariff and subsidy policies yields: 
11 11 1 12 1 121 1
1 2 11 21 2 12 2 2211
22 2 2 21 21 1 22 1 22
1 2 11 21 2 12 2 22
g g g g g g
g g g g g g g gg
g g g g g g g
g g g g g g g g
I I h I h ICC CC
h h s s h s h sdhdCC
dhdCC CC CC I I h I h I
h h s s h s h s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ − − − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥− − − −⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
11
22
11 21 11 12
21 12 21 1221 21
12 1212 22 21 22
21 12 121 112
g
g
g g g g
g g g gg g
g gg g g g
g g
ds
ds
M M I I
t td dt
d dtM M I I
t t
τ τ τ
τ
τ τ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
   
where 1gii giitτ = =  because there are no trade impediments to local sales. It should be 
emphasized that when we interpret changes in the vector gds  as changes in domestic subsidies 
only, the constraint ( )gij gjj gj gids ds h h=  must be imposed in the total differentiation of (8) 
because subsidy levels must be the same across destinations. The unconstrained case involves 
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domestic and export subsidies.  In order to isolate the effects of domestic support reduction, we 
will focus on the constrained case. The above system can be rewritten in compact form as:  
1 11 21 211
2 12 12 122
g g g g
g g g g
dh ds d dtdCC
dh ds d dtdCC
τ
τ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= + + +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
J S Τ ϒ       (9) 
where J  is the Jacobian matrix of the system. For further reference, denote the elements of the 
Jacobian by: 11 12
21 22
a a
a a
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.  
 
Lemma 1: The Jacobian has a dominant diagonal such that ii ijj ia a≠> ∑ . 
 
Proof: See the technical appendix. 
 
 
Lemma 2: The Jacobian matrix is negative definite. At the equilibrium vector of prices, the 
determinant of the Jacobian matrix, denoted  | |J , is positive.  
Proof: See the technical appendix. 
 
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the elements of the Jacobian have the following signs: 
⎡ ⎤− +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ −⎣ ⎦
.  
Moreover, the negative definiteness of the Jacobian implies that ( )1 0r r rπ− >J ; where r J  and 
rJ  are matrices for which the first r rows and first r columns of matrix J are retained 
respectively and π  refers to permutations involving the rth row and column. Hence, the impact 
of a change in either 1) domestic support ( )gijs , 2) primary goods’ trade costs ( )gijt ; and 3) final 
goods’ trade cost ( )gijτ  can be investigated using Cramer’s rule.  
We also assume that a change in domestic support in country j has a greater impact on the 
price of the primary commodity in country j than in country i. 
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Assumption 3: gj gjj gi gijdh ds dh ds> . 
 
Reduction in domestic support 
This section investigates the effect of a change in domestic support on the endogenous variables 
of the model. Proposition 1 summarizes the effects of changing the level of domestic support on 
prices of primary goods and on bilateral trade flows of primary and processed products.  
 
Proposition 1: A decrease in domestic support offered by country 1: i) increases the price of the 
primary good in both countries;. ii) decreases domestic and export sales of the primary good for 
country 2; iii) increases country 2’s export sales of primary goods but has an ambiguous impact 
on its domestic sales; iv) decreases domestic and exports sales of the processed goods for both 
countries.  
Proof: See the technical appendix. 
 
Proposition 1 is rather intuitive. As expected, the country that reduces its production subsidy on 
the primary good experiences decreases in domestic and export sales for that good while the 
export sales of its trading partner increase. This outcome is due to the increases in the prices of 
the primary good in both countries induced by the subsidy reduction. However the increase in the 
price of the primary good in the country that lowered its subsidy offset only partially the subsidy 
reduction. A decrease in the production subsidy of the primary good increases the marginal cost 
of production of processed commodities and the price paid by consumers. Because this occurs in 
both countries, exports and domestic sales of the processed commodity fall in both countries. 
Hence, the reduction of the production subsidy jointly decrease exports and domestic sales of 
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both primary and processed products in the trade liberalizing country8, but the effect on the 
trading partner’s domestic sales of the primary product is ambiguous.9  
 
Change in market access rules for primary goods 
We now turn our attention to the impacts of changes in primary good’s trade costs. Trade costs 
can take many forms, but the discussion is cast in terms of tariffs because they are directly 
related to market access and are under the control of policymakers.       
 
Proposition 2: A decrease in country 2’s tariff on the primary good: i) has an ambiguous effect 
on (decreases) the price of the primary good in country 1 (2), but it reduces the spread between 
the prices of the primary good ; ii) has an ambiguous impact on (increases) domestic (export) 
sales of country 1’s primary good ; iii) has an ambiguous impact on (decreases) country 2’s 
export (domestic) sales of primary goods; iv) has an ambiguous impact on (increases) country 
1(2)’s domestic and export sales of the processed products. 
Proof: See the technical appendix. 
 
Because of the many ambiguities, the results presented in Proposition 2 are less intuitive than 
those presented in Proposition 1. As such, they reveal the complexity of modeling bilateral trade 
in vertically-related products and justify the space devoted to our two-country example. The 
impacts of a decrease in country 2’s tariff on imports of the primary good produced in country 1 
(i.e., an increase in 21gt  in our notation) has an ambiguous effect on the price of the primary good 
in country 1.  As shown in the appendix, the direction of the change hinges on the sign of  
( ) ( )
11, 22 11 21 12 21 21g g g g
a I t a I tJ ϒ = ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂  where 22 0a < , 11 21 0g gI t∂ ∂ < , 12 0a > and 
21 21 0g gI t∂ ∂ > . In a model with unidirectional trade, improved market access bring about an 
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increase in the price of the exporter and a decrease in the price of the importer. The latter 
remains true in our model, but the former need not happen because 
11,
0J ϒ
>
<
. The term 
( )11 21 22g gI t a∂ ∂  is positive as it embodies the reduction in the domestic supply of primary good 
in country 1 and a vertical linkage effect that reflects the excess demand for primary goods 
(including imports from country 1) from processors in country 2 relative to the supply of primary 
product. This is offset by the negative effect due to the product ( )21 21 12g gI t a− ∂ ∂  which 
captures the lower demand from processors in country 1 that results from the decrease in the 
price of the primary good produced in country 2.  The fact that the price of the primary good in 
country 1 may be negatively affected by the decrease in country 2’s tariff is peculiar, but this 
does not preclude the expected convergence effect of liberalization on the prices of the primary 
good.  
As for the bilateral trade in primary goods between the two countries, the decrease in 
country 2’s tariff increases market access for the primary good exported by country 1. The 
resulting lower price for country 2’s primary product encourages that country’s production of 
processed products which in turn translate into higher domestic and export sales of processed 
goods by country 2. Naturally, exports of primary products from country 1 increase at the 
expense of country 2’s domestic sales, but domestic sales of primary products in country 1 need 
not decline.  Note that this result differs from the standard partial equilibrium analysis and is 
directly related to the ambiguous effects of the reduction in country 2’s tariff on primary 
products on country 1’s domestic and export sales of processed products.  The fall in the price of 
the primary good produced in country 2 is beneficial to processors in both countries, but the 
competitive position of processing firms in both countries has been altered as the impact of the 
  14
tariff reduction is relatively stronger in the country practicing trade liberalization. Still, the 
aggregate volume of trade in processed goods increases due to the lower tariff on country 2’s 
primary good.  
 
Change in market access rules for processed goods 
Finally, the effects of changes in final goods’ trade costs on the price of primary agricultural 
goods and bilateral trade flows are analyzed. For simplicity, trade costs are referred to as import 
tariffs in what follows; although they can represent a myriad of other costs (transportation, 
brokerage fees, etc.).  Proposition 3 investigates the effects of changes in market access on prices 
of primary goods and bilateral trade flows in primary and final goods. It is worth pointing out 
that unlike for the primary good trade cost, an increase in gjiτ  should be interpreted as an 
increase in country j’s tariff on processed goods imported from country i.  
   
Proposition 3: A decrease in country 2’s tariff on the processed good exported by country 1: i) 
increases (has an ambiguous effect on) the price of the primary good in country 1 (2), but if the 
price of the primary good in country 2 increases, it does not increase as much as in country 1; ii) 
increases country 1’s exports of the processed good, but it decreases its domestic sales; iii) has 
an ambiguous impact on sales of the processed good by country 2; iv) increases country 1’s 
domestic sales of the primary good, but has an ambiguous impact on its exports; and finally v) 
increases country 2’s exports of the primary good and has an ambiguous effect on its domestic 
sales. 
Proof: See the technical appendix. 
 
The effect of country 2’s reduction of its tariff on processed goods increases the demand for 
imports of processed goods from country 1 which in turn increases the demand for primary 
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goods in country 1. As a result, the price of the primary good in country 1 increases.  The price 
of the primary good in country 2 may also increase. This peculiar outcome is likely to occur 
when the increase in the price of the primary good from country 1 induces a large increase in the 
demand for the primary good produced in country 2 and when country 1’s exports of processed 
products increase significantly in response to the lower tariff. As a matter of fact, country 2’s 
exports of primary goods to country 1 increase in response to the reduction in its tariff on 
processed goods.  
One might expect the tariff reduction to lower country 2’s domestic sales of processed 
goods because of the substitution effect between country 1 and country 2’s processed goods, but 
this need not happen because the effects on country 1’s exports of primary goods and country 2’s 
domestic sales of primary goods happen to be ambiguous. On the other hand, the decrease in 
domestic sales of processed goods in country 1 is more in line with what one would expect in a 
standard partial equilibrium trade model without cross-hauling. 
Table 1 summarizes the comparative static exercises presented in this section. The results 
are reported for three liberalization scenarios (i.e. reducing domestic support and lowering 
tariffs). As a set, they reveal the complexity of modeling bi-directional trade in vertically-related 
products even when the number of countries is restricted to two. 
 
4. Which of tariff reductions and domestic support reductions should a small open 
economy prioritize in the presence of non-tariff barriers? 
 
This section presents numerical simulations based on a 3-country version of the framework 
introduced in the previous two sections. Our objective is to investigate whether it is preferable to 
have large policy countries lower tariffs or domestic subsidies on agricultural goods from the 
perspective of a small open economy in the context of multilateral negotiations. It is generally 
recognized that tariffs are more distorting than domestic support policies because they distort 
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both production and consumption decisions.10 As such, one could be tempted to conclude that 
negotiators should be more aggressive on tariff reductions than on domestic support reductions. 
However, the argument favouring tariff reductions is less evident when one considers that 
supply-side rigidities and non-tariff barriers are pervasive in the agricultural sector and that 
vertical linkages between primary and processed goods can drastically impact on the effects of 
tariff reductions. In particular, partial tariff liberalization scenarios and less than comprehensive 
disciplines on domestic support may cause situations in which disciplining domestic support 
yields greater benefits than tariff reductions. The parameter γ  plays a key role on the direction 
and magnitude of the effects induced by changes in policies targeted at primary goods. In fact, it 
creates a “technical partner bias”. A low value of γ  imply that producers of the primary good 
and processing firms in any given country are more dependant on each other because primary 
goods are not as easily transferable between the domestic and export markets as final goods. 
Conversely, a high value of γ  implies that primary good suppliers can supply all countries 
without making significant adjustments to their product.  
In what follows, we assume that consumers derive utility from consuming a 
manufactured good and a processed food product. There is no income effect in the consumption 
of the food product due to quasi-linear preferences of consumers that legitimizes the partial 
equilibrium structure of the model. The downstream food processing firms combine the primary 
agricultural goods with labour to produce the processed good/food. It is assumed that the price of 
labour is exogenous to the agri-food sector. The technology in the downstream agri-food sector 
follows closely the assumptions of Lai and Trefler (2004) and Alvarez and Lucas Jr. (2006) as 
labour (denoted jL ) and the primary good (denoted jI ) enter a Cobb-Douglas production 
function such that: 1j j jTFP I L
θ θ− ; where jTFP  is the total factor productivity specific to each 
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country. Factor prices in country j are respectively denoted by jh  and jw . The supply of labour 
is perfectly elastic from the perspective of agri-food firms and thus perceive jw  as a constant. 
Under these assumptions, marginal cost in country j is: 1j j j jc w h
θ θϖ −= ; where 1j jTFPϖ ≡ . In 
the upstream market, cost minimization under the technology constraint yields the following cost 
function: ( )j j j j jI w Iβ βφ φ≡w . 
There is little arguing that the U.S. and the EU are the two most important economic 
powers and that they both heavily subsidize agriculture. As such, one or the other is the main 
trade partner of a very large number of countries. Consequently, a three-country trade model is 
the simplest structure allowing us to investigate agricultural trade liberalization scenarios from 
the perspective of a small open economy. It is assumed that income in the small open economy, 
also referred to as the third country, is about five times lower than the income in the large 
countries. The third country is heavily dependent on export markets and does not support its 
agricultural sector with coupled subsidies. Hence, 13 23 33 1s s s= = =  is observed in country #3 
while 11 21 31 12 22 32 1.5s s s s s s= = = = = =  in the two large economies. The import tariffs in the 
upstream agricultural sector of countries #1 and #2 are set such that they yield a tariff-equivalent 
measure of 50%; hence 12 13 21 23 0.67t t t t= = = = . The trade costs in the downstream agri-food 
sector of countries #1 and #2 are set to 12 13 21 23 2τ τ τ τ= = = =  which imply 100% ad valorem 
tariffs. Country #3 pursues a free trade policy.    
The above baseline values were purposely chosen to portray tariff escalation as higher 
duties are applied on processed products and lower duties are applied on primary goods. Tariff 
escalation measures are often based on the effective rate of protection, but the validity of such 
measures is questionable when the small country assumption does not hold (Golub and Finger, 
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1979). The Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) of product j is computed as: j ij ii
ij ii
T a T
ERP
a T
−= ∑∑

 ; 
where jT  is the tariff applied on product j, ( )ij ij i ja a p p=  and the ija ’s are input-output 
coefficients. When terms of trade are endogenous, as in our framework, a better measure of tariff 
escalation is the tariff wedge between input i and output j: j iTW T T= − . When the processed 
product is more protected than the input 0TW >  and 0j iERP t t> > > .  
There are three market clearing conditions in our three-country model:  
( )1 2 3 1 2 3 ; 1, 2,3k k k k k k kI I I M M M k+ + = Λ + + =       (10) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )1k k k kw hθ θ θθ θ ϖ−Λ ≡ −  is the conversion factor between the primary and the 
processed goods.  It is assumed that tariff revenues are rebated to consumers in a lump-sum 
fashion and that export and domestic subsidies are financed through lump-sum taxation. Finally, 
welfare boils down to the sum of consumers’ surplus, firms’ profits and net government 
revenues. The latter term includes tariff revenues minus subsidy payments:    
( ) ( ) ( )3 31 1 11 1 1j ji j ji ij i ij ji ji jii i iTR t h I s h I p Mτ= = == + − − + −∑ ∑ ∑     (11) 
The market clearing conditions in (10) and the import demand and export supply functions 
defined in (4) and (6) provide the necessary structure to solve for the three endogenous prices 
{ }1 2 3, ,h h h . 
Table 2 lists the actual values of each parameter used in the baseline solution. The 
structural parameters pertaining to countries #1 and #2 are assumed to be identical. However, 
technological differences are introduced between the two large countries and the small open 
economy (country #3). Specifically, it is assumed that the productivity in the downstream and 
upstream agri-food sectors is higher in country #3. In the simulated liberalization scenarios, we 
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allow parameters γ  and η  to vary. The former measures the degree of substitution across export 
markets for primary agricultural goods (i.e., low substitution implies significant non-tariff 
barriers) while the latter measures substitution between country-specific varieties of processed 
goods. Three scenarios are simulated. In the first, linear cuts are applied to domestic support 
holding tariffs constant. In the second, linear tariff cuts are applied while holding domestic 
support constant.  Cuts are assumed to be applied in ten equal incremental steps until free trade is 
achieved. Given the initial starting values in Table 2, domestic support is reduced from 50% to 
45%, … all the way down to 0%. Similarly, tariffs on processed and primary goods are 
respectively cut from their initial values of 100% and 50% to 90% and 45% and so on until free 
trade is achieved. Note that tariff escalation remains along the liberalization paths, but the extent 
of tariff escalation (measured by TW) is reduced as tariffs converge to zero.11 Finally, a more 
ambitious liberalization scenario is simulated in which domestic support and tariffs are decreased 
linearly and simultaneously.  
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of country 3’s welfare when tariffs and/or domestic 
support is reduced and γ  and η  are set to 2. Reductions in domestic support have adverse 
effects on the welfare of country 3 if tariffs are held fixed. Early on in the tariff-only 
liberalization scenario, tariff cuts also decrease welfare, but tariff cuts have the desired positive 
effects once the liberalization process has reached the half-way mark. Gains from the more 
ambitious liberalization scenario are observed even later, that is when the tariff on processed 
(primary) goods is down to 30% (15%) and the subsidy is down to 15%.  The results in Figure 1 
reflect the declining significance of the benefits accruing to processing firms in the small country 
as production subsidies offered by large countries decline. The relatively low value of γ  imply 
that agricultural producers in the small country are confronted to significant non-tariff barriers 
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and cannot easily increase their export sales when domestic support is lowered in the large 
countries. Consequently, the price of the primary good in country 3 increases rather modestly as 
liberalization progresses, as illustrated in Figure 2. Agricultural producers benefit from higher 
prices, but downstream firms in country 3 must cope with higher marginal costs. The price of 
processed goods in country 3 reacts to this cost-push effect, which is stronger under the tariff-
only scenario, as illustrated in Figure 3.    
Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution of country 3’s exports of primary and processed 
goods. In the domestic support-only (tariff-only) liberalization scenario, exports of processed 
goods decrease (increase) (Figure 5) while exports of primary goods increase under all three 
scenarios (Figure 4). Domestic sales of primary goods increase at similar rates under the two 
partial liberalization scenarios (Figure 6) while domestic sales of processed goods fall regardless 
of the scenario chosen (Figure 7). The sums of domestic and export sales for the primary and 
processed goods at various stages of liberalization are depicted in Figures 8 and 9. Under the 
domestic support-only scenario, total sales of primary (processed) products increase (decrease) 
as large countries cut their subsidies. As noted before, this liberalization scenario decreases 
overall welfare for country 3 which clearly benefits from the lower prices for primary goods 
caused by the large countries’ production subsidies. 
When tariff protection is the only instrument being reduced, country 3 experiences small 
gains from liberalization because it cannot increase exports significantly due to the relatively low 
value of γ  and η . Figure 4 and 5 illustrate the export paths for primary and processed goods.  
While simultaneous cuts in domestic subsidies and tariffs stimulate exports of primary goods, the 
same cannot be said about exports of processed products as they stay relatively constant due to 
the offsetting effects of the decrease in domestic support on the marginal cost of domestic 
processors and the effect of the tariff cuts on processed goods on the demand for these goods.   
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In a tariff-only liberalization scenario, domestic sales of the primary good increase (see 
Figure 6), but domestic sales of the processed good decrease (see Figure 7). The latter impact is 
caused by the greater demands for imports from large countries. The increase in the domestic 
demand for primary goods explains the increases in country 3’s domestic sales of primary goods.  
Domestic sales of the processed good fall under the domestic support-only and tariffs-only 
liberalization scenarios, but exports decrease in the domestic support-only scenario and increase 
in the tariff-only scenario.    
Clearly, the best scenario for the small country is the most ambitious liberalization 
scenario even though the gains begin to materialize only near the end of the process. In fact, 
global free trade maximizes world welfare. Yet when confronted with the mutually exclusive 
options of lowering tariff or decreasing domestic support, the small open economy obtains a 
greater utility when tariff cuts are implemented.  It is worth pointing out that small and moderate 
cuts in both tariffs and domestic support from the highly distorted initial equilibrium actually 
decrease the small country’s welfare. This simple numerical illustration rationalizes the 
seemingly bold demands of many small exporting countries in multilateral negotiations. In this 
instance, “small steps” in multilateral negotiations would impose sustained losses in welfare for 
country 3 and the promise of future gains from trade liberalization might seriously be questioned.      
 Simulation results presented in Figures 1-9 are conditioned on specific values of γ  and 
η . Figure 10 illustrates the welfare paths for country 3 when primary goods are more 
substitutable across export destinations and when consumers can more easily substitute 
processed goods from different countries (i.e., 8γ η= = ). Keeping in mind that Figures 1 and 
10 have different welfare scales, we can see that the gains are much more spectacular and that 
the possibility of initial welfare losses has vanished as the small country’s welfare is 
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monotonically increasing in the level of liberalization for all three scenarios considered. In this 
instance, reductions in domestic support in large countries generate larger welfare gains than 
tariff reductions.  Figure 11 and 12 analyze the implications of asymmetries in the conditioning 
parameters (i.e., 8, 2γ η= =  and 2, 8γ η= = . The welfare patterns in Figure 11 are very 
similar to Figure 10 and domestic support reductions ought to be prioritized by the small country 
if a more ambitious liberalization process cannot be initiated. This ranking contrasts with the 
evidence presented in Figure 12. In this case, the presence of more important non-tariff barriers 
makes tariff-reductions as desirable as domestic support reductions. More importantly, the 
presence of more important non-tariff barriers drastically reduces welfare. The gains from trade 
in Figure 10 are roughly 10 times higher than those in Figure 12 under the full liberalization 
scenario!      
 Interesting insights about tariff escalation can also be gained by examining the simulation 
results. Much is being said about tariff escalation, but what are the implications of reducing it?  
As mentioned before, tariff escalation is reduced as tariffs are reduced.  A glace at Figures 1, 10, 
11 and 12 suggests that reductions in tariff escalation do not bring about significant increases in 
welfare when only tariffs are lowered. To gain some insight as to why this is the case, consider 
that when the tariff wedge is large, the production subsidy component of the tariff in the primary 
sector is much larger than the net subsidy component in the processing sector. Recall that the 
tariff on imports of the primary good implies a tax on the processing sector which is exceeds the 
production subsidy component of the import tariff on final goods. Bridging the gap between the 
two encourages exports of the final good as illustrated in Figure 5, but it does not significantly 
increase welfare because of the remaining distortions in the primary sectors of the large 
countries. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
Multilateral negotiations pertaining to agricultural trade liberalization are currently at a 
crossroads. Small open economies are pressing large policy-active countries to lower their 
subsidies while pressures to open up borders to trade in agricultural products are meeting 
resistance from a subset of small and large economies. This paper builds a theoretical gravity 
model to explain trade flows of primary and processed agricultural products. At the consumer 
level, commodities are differentiated according to their country of origin while primary 
agricultural goods are homogenous from the buyers’ perspective. To account for the notoriety of 
non-tariff barriers in agriculture, it is assumed that primary goods can not be substituted 
costlessly across destinations from the sellers’ perspective. Examples of non-tariff barriers 
include technical and sanitary regulations. These assumptions yield well-behaved import demand 
functions at the consumer level and export supply functions at the producer level. Imperfect 
substitution in consumption and production is captured by two structural parameters. The role of 
these parameters in explaining bilateral trade patterns is investigated through numerical 
simulations of a three-country international trade models involving vertically-linked products.  
The numerical simulations provide insights as to whether it is more important for a small 
open economy to reduce tariffs or domestic support. It is assumed that two identically large 
countries use import tariffs to restrict trade in primary and processed commodities. Our 
benchmark is characterized by tariff escalation, a relatively common phenomenon for 
agricultural products. Like the United States and the European Union, our large countries also 
offer coupled domestic support to domestic producers of the primary good. The small country is 
a free trader. When substitutions in consumption and in production are limited due to important 
non-tariff barriers and strong product differentiation, it is shown that reducing domestic support 
while holding tariffs fixed actually decreases the small country’s welfare. Under the tariff-only 
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liberalization scenario, welfare initially decreases but increases near the end of the process.  Free 
trade is obviously the first-best policy from the world and the small country’s perspective. 
However, the small country would prefer the status quo over a scenario in which the large 
countries propose aggressive cuts in domestic support and timid tariff cuts. The failure to quickly 
raise welfare in small economies may seriously undermine their convictions about the benefits of 
multilateral trade negotiations. Sustained welfare losses could incite to negotiate preferential 
trade agreements or worse to embrace an import-substitution strategy. 
The stumbling blocks to achieve sizeable welfare gains under various liberalization 
scenarios depend on production efficiency parameters in each country, but also on relative 
importance of non-tariff barriers. Our simulations show that non-tariff barriers drastically reduce 
welfare gains under all liberalization scenarios. They also impact on the ranking of the scenarios 
(tariff-only versus domestic support-only). Consequently, it is imperative to gain knowledge of 
the value of the parameter that accounts for non-tariff barriers. Our gravity model lends itself to 
an econometric analysis. However, the vertical relationships between primary and processed 
goods raise particularly challenging issues such as non-linear restrictions across equations and 
endogeneity. 
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Table 1. Summary of the comparative static for the two-country example. 
 
Variable 
↓ domestic support 
in country i  
↓ country j’s import tariff on  
primary good g 
↓ country j’s import tariff 
on final good g 
Prices of the primary good    
    Country i ↑ ↑ / ↓ ↑ 
    Country j ↑ ↓ ↑ / ↓ 
Quantities of primary good     
    Exports of country i ↓ ↑ ↑ / ↓ 
    Domestic sales of i  ↓ ↑ / ↓ ↑ 
    Exports of country j ↑ ↑ / ↓ ↑ 
    Domestic sales of country j ↑ / ↓ ↓ ↑ / ↓ 
Quantities of processed goods    
    Exports of country i ↓ ↑ / ↓ ↑ 
    Domestic sales of country i ↓ ↑ / ↓ ↓ 
    Exports of country j ↓ ↑ ↑ / ↓ 
    Domestic sales of country j  ↓ ↑ ↑ / ↓ 
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Table 2. Structural parameters in the baseline numerical solution 
Parameters  Value 
Income  1 2 35 5Y Y Y= = =
Cost share of labour in the downstream market level  1 0.5θ− =
Productivity in the processing sector  3 1 20.75 0.75 1ω ω ω= = =
Price of labour  1 2 3 1w w w= = =
Productivity parameter in the upstream sector  1 2 31.33 1.33 0.75φ φ φ= = =
Cost function parameter in the upstream sector  2β =
 
Import tariffs for the primary good in sector 2 
 11 12 231.5 1.5 1t t t= = =  
21 22 231.5 1.5 1t t t= = =  
31 32 33 1t t t= = =
 
Import tariffs for the consumer-ready good in sector 2 
 11 12 130.5 2τ τ τ= = =  
21 22 230.5 2τ τ τ= = =  
31 32 330.5 2τ τ τ= = =
 
Domestic support / export subsidy 
 12 22 32 1.5s s s= = =  
12 22 32 1.5s s s= = =  
13 23 33 1s s s= = =
Varieties in the manufacture and agri-food sectors   1 2 3 10N N N= = =
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Figure 1. Country 3’s welfare  ( 2; 2γ η= = ) 
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Figure 2. Country 3’s price of the primary good ( )2; 2γ η= =  
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Tariffs:
100%/50%
Subsidy: 50%
Tariffs:
90%/45%
Subsidy: 45%
Tariff: 80%/40%
Subsidy: 40%
Tariffs:
70%/35%
Subsidy: 35%
Tariffs:
60%/30%
Subsidy: 30%
Tarifs:
50%/25%
Subsidy: 25%
Tariffs:
40%/20%
Subsidy: 20%
Tariffs:
30%/15%
Subsidy: 15%
Tariffs:
20%/10%
Subsidy: 10%
Tariffs: 10%/5%
Subsidy: 5%
0%
Tariff-only Subsidy-only Global
 
Figure 3. Country 3’s price of the processed good  ( )2; 2γ η= =  
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Figure 4. Country 3’s exports of primary goods ( 2; 2γ η= = ) 
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Figure 5. Country 3’s exports of processed goods  ( )2; 2γ η= =  
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Figure 6. Country 3’s domestic sales of primary goods ( 2; 2γ η= = ) 
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Figure 7. Country 3’s domestic sales of processed goods  ( )2; 2γ η= =  
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Figure 8. Country 3’s total sales of primary goods ( 2; 2γ η= = ) 
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Figure 9. Country 3’s total sales of processed good ( )2; 2γ η= =  
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Figure 10.  Country 3’s welfare ( 8; 8γ η= = ) 
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Figure 11. Country 3’s welfare ( 8; 2γ η= = ) 
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Figure 12. Country 3’s welfare  ( 2; 8γ η= = ) 
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Technical appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: A matrix M has a dominant diagonal element if for some 0p   we have 
that 0Mp . This condition implies that 11 12a a> . The terms 11a  and 12a  are:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 1 1
1 1
11 1 1 11 12
12
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1
1,2 1,2
1 11 1
11 21 1 1 1 11 21 1 1 1
1 1
1
1
gg g g
g g g g g
g g h g h g h h g h
h h
g g g g g g g
a h w I I
p s t I D h I
M M N c c
θθ θ θ
δ
η η η
θ θ ϖ
δ
η χ τ τ η
−+ −
−
= =
− − −− −
= − − +
⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ + − + −
∑ ∑γ γ   (12) 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
1
1 1 1
12
12 1 2 2 1
1,2
1 11
11 21 2 12 22 2
1
1
g g g g h g h g h gh
h
g g g g g g g g
a p s t I D
M M N c
δ
σ σ σ
δ γ
η χ τ τ
−
=
− − −−
= +
+ + − +
∑
 (13) 
where ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1g g gδ γ β γ β≡ − − + −  (with ( )1 0g gδ + >γ ), ( )( 1)g g g gα η η∆ ≡ − , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 1 1 11 11 1 21 1 2 12 2 22 2 0g g g g g g g g g g gN c c N c cη η η ηχ τ τ τ τ− − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ + + + >⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , and 
( ) ( )111 1 1 2 2 2 0gggj g g j g j g g j g jD h s t h s t ++≡ + >γγ . 
Subtracting (13) from (12) yields: 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 12
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
1,2 1
1 1 1
11 1 11 12 11 21 1
1 1 1 11
11 21 1 11 21 1 2 12 22 2
1
1 1
1
gg g g
g g g g g
g
g g g g h g h g h gh g h g h g h g h g h
h g
g g g g g g g g
g g g g g g g g g g g g
p s t I D s t s t I
h
h w I I M M c
M M N c N c
θ
θθ θ θ
σ σ σ σ σ
θ
θ θ ϖ η
σ χ τ τ τ τ
−
=
−+ − −
− − − − − −−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
− − + − +
+ + − + − +
∑ γγ
( )gσ
  (14) 
All terms in the previous equation are negative except for the first one. In a world with no trade 
costs and no domestic support on primary products ( )2 1 2 11; 1g h g h g h g ht t s s= = = = , the whole 
expression in (14) is negative which implies that 11 12a a> . In a world with trade costs, but no 
domestic support, we have that 11 21 211 0g g gt t t− = − >  and thus a sufficient condition for (14) to 
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be negative is that  ( )( ) ( )1 1 111 1 21 11 1 0gg g g g g gI D t hθβ − − −− − − − <γ γ   because we know that 
( ) ( )12 22 12 1 0g g gt t t− = − < . From (6) we know that ( )( ) 11 1 111 1 11 0g g g g gI D hθβ − − −− − − <γ γ  and 
( )( )1 111 1 21 211 0gg g g g gI D s tθβ − −− − − <γ ; which establishes that 11 12a a> . The proof when 
domestic support is positive follows the same pattern.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: This result appeals directly to Lemma 1 and theorem M.D.5 in Mas-Colell 
et al. (1995).   
 
Proof of proposition 1: Let 
11,S
J  be a matrix in which the first column of the Jacobian is 
replaced by the first column of matrix S (denoted 1S ) while setting 22 0gds = : 
( )( )
( )( )1
11 11 11 21 1 2 12
1,
21 11 21 21 1 2 22
g g g g g g
g g g g g g
I s I s h h a
I s I s h h a
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
SJ       (15) 
Using Cramer’s rule, we have that:
11 11 1,
sign sign| |g gdh ds⎡ ⎤=⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ SJ  given that 
111 11 1,g g
dh ds SJ J≡ . The determinant is:  
( )( )( )
( )( )( )
11, 22 11 11 11 21 1 2
12 21 11 21 21 1 2 0
g g g g g g
g g g g g g
a I s I s h h
a I s I s h h
= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂
− ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ <
SJ
     (16) 
The negative definiteness of the Jacobian implies that the product of the first terms on the right 
hand-side of (16) is negative (theorem M.D.2 of Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The product of the 
second term is greater than zero because J has a dominant diagonal; thus making the expression 
in (16) unambiguously negative as 1 1 0gi giI s∂ ∂ >  (from equation (6)). The impact of country 1’s 
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subsidy on the price of the primary good in country 2 is determined by 
12 11 2,g g
dh ds SJ J≡ . 
Because J  is positive, we have that: [ ]
112 11 2,
sign sign| |h s SJ∂ ∂ = ; with:  
( )( )( )
( )( )( )
12, 21 11 11 11 21 1 2
11 21 11 21 21 1 2 0
g g g g g g
g g g g g g
a I s I s h h
a I s I s h h
= − ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂
+ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ <
SJ
     (17) 
The second product on the right hand-side of (17) is negative because J is negative definite (thus 
11 0a < ) and assumption 3. Hence, country 1’s domestic support for its primary good g is 
negatively correlated with the price of the primary good in country j; j i≠ . This proves part i).   
We now jump to the proof of part iv) because we will use it for the proof of parts ii) and 
iii).  The impact of a change in domestic support offered by country 1 on sales of processed 
products is computed from totally differentiating the export supply and import demand functions. 
Let us consider first the two last parts of the proposition. Part iii) is proven by analyzing the 
impacts of primary good prices on the sales of processed goods. Differentiating the import 
demand functions defined in (4) with respect to the subsidy offered by country 1 yields:  
11 1 11 2
11 11 11
1 11 2 11
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
M h M h
dM ds ds
h s h s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂       (18) 
21 1 21 2
21 11 11
1 11 2 11
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
M h M h
dM ds ds
h s h s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂       (19) 
Using (4), it is relatively easy to show that 11 2 11 10g g g gM h M h∂ ∂ > > ∂ ∂ . Moreover, 
assumptions 2 and 3 states that 11 1 11 2g g g gM h M h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  and gi gi gj gih s h s∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ ; implying 
that: 11 11 0g gM s∂ ∂ > . As previously mentioned, the import demand functions defined in (4) 
imply that: 21 2 21 10g g g gM h M h∂ ∂ > > ∂ ∂  which under the assumption that 
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21 1 21 2g g g gM h M h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  and gi gi gj gih s h s∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  implies 21 11 0g gM s∂ ∂ > ; thus proving 
part iii).  
Finally, to derive the impact of a subsidy on the other country’s sales of processed 
commodities, we totally differentiating the import demand functions with respect to 1gs  and 
using (4), it is easy to show that 12 1 0g gM h∂ ∂ > , 22 1 0g gM h∂ ∂ > , 12 2 0g gM h∂ ∂ <  and 
22 2 0g gM h∂ ∂ < . Under certain regularity conditions, 12 1 0g gM s∂ ∂ >  and 22 1 0g gM s∂ ∂ > ; 
which completes the proof of part iv).  
We now consider parts ii) and iii). First, we differentiate the export supply functions of 
countries 1 and 2 with respect to 11gs : 
11 11 1 11 2
11 11 11 11
11 1 11 2 11
g g g g g
g g g g
g g g g g
I I h I h
dI ds ds ds
s h s h s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂      (20) 
 21 21 1 21 221 11 11 11
1 1 1 2 1
g g g g g
g g g g
g g g g g
I I h I h
dI ds ds ds
s h s h s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂      (21) 
 12 1 12 212 11 11
1 11 2 11
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
I h I h
dI ds ds
h s h s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂         (22) 
22 1 22 2
22 11 11
1 11 2 11
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
I h I h
dI ds ds
h s h s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂        (23)  
Equation (20) summarizes the three effects of a subsidy on domestic sales of the primary 
product. From equation (6), the direct effect of the subsidy is to increase domestic sales 
( )1 0gii g iI s∂ ∂ > . The production subsidy has two indirect effects through its impact on the price 
of the primary product in countries 1 and 2. Proposition 1 already showed that 1 11 0g gh s∂ ∂ <  and 
2 11 0g gh s∂ ∂ < . Because the export supply function to one particular destination country is 
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respectively positively and negatively correlated with the price prevailing in that country and the 
other country (see equation (6)), the second term of the right-hand side of (20) is negative and 
the third is positive. The ambiguity simply reflects the potential for a Metzler-like effect 
(backward-bending supply).  However, we will show that under our assumptions and the market 
clearing condition 11 12 11 21
11 11 11 11
g g g g
g g g g
dI dI dM dM
ds ds ds ds
+ = + , a domestic subsidy increases domestic sales.  
The right-hand side terms of (21), (22) and (23) are signed using a similar argument. Moreover, 
under assumptions 2 and 3, gii gi gii gjI h I h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  and gi gii gj giih s h s∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ ; which lead to 
21 11 0g gdI ds >  and 12 11 0g gdI ds < . However, these conditions are not sufficient to 
unambiguously sign 22 11g gI s∂ ∂ . From the market clearing condition, we find that: 
11 12 11 21
11 11 11 11
0g g g g
g g g g
dI dI dM dM
ds ds ds ds
=− + + >  which rules out a Metzler effect and resolves the 
ambiguity about the effect of domestic support on domestic sales; which completes the proof of 
parts ii and iii).     Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of proposition 2: The proof of proposition 2 is structured along the lines of the proof of 
proposition 1. At the outset, it should be reiterated that an increase in gijt  can be construed as an 
increase in market access or a decrease in the tariff rate as the degree of friction falls.  Let 
11,
J ϒ  
be a matrix in which the first column of the Jacobian is replaced with the first column of matrix 
ϒ  (denoted 1ϒ ) while setting 12 0gdt = : 1 11 21 121,
21 21 22
g g
g g
I t a
I t a
J ϒ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
. Because 
11 21 1,
=g gh t J Jϒ∂ ∂ , we need to investigate the sign of the numerator: 
( ) ( )
11, 22 11 21 12 21 21g g g g
a I t a I tJ ϒ = ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂  where 22 0a <  and 12 0a > . From (6), it can be 
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ascertained that country 2’s tariff reduction increases country 1’s exports at the expense of its 
domestic sales: 11 21 0g gI t∂ ∂ <  and 21 21 0g gI t∂ ∂ > . Lemmas 1 and 2 cannot be used to resolve 
the ambiguity and without stronger assumptions, the effect of reducing country 2’s trade barrier 
on country 1’s price of the primary product cannot be unambiguously signed.  The impact of 
country 2’s tariff reduction on its own domestic price is determined by: 
12 21 2,
=g gh t J Jϒ∂ ∂ ; 
with ( ) ( )
12, 21 11 21 11 21 21g g g g
a I t a I tϒ = − ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂J . The first product in the expression is positive 
while the second negative. Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the absolute value of 11a  is greater than 
21a  and assuming that 11 21 21 21g g g gI t I t∂ ∂ <∂ ∂ , the effect of a reduction in country 2’s tariff on 
the price of country 2’s intermediate good is unambiguously negative. If the tariff reduction elicit 
changes in opposite directions for 1gh  and 2gh , the spread will be reduced.  However, this is so 
even when both prices decrease because the following expression is positive: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 11, 2, 11 21 22 21 21 21 12 11g g g gsign sign I t a a I t a aJ Jϒ ϒ− = ∂ ∂ + − ∂ ∂ + . The positive sign 
is due to Lemmas 1 and 2 and equation (6). Therefore, if 1gh  decreases, it cannot decrease more 
than  2gh .  This proves part i).     
 Setting aside parts ii) and iii) for the time being and moving to part iv), we differentiate 
the demand functions for the processed good with respect to 21gt :  
11 1 11 2
11 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
M h M h
dM dt dt
h t h t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ; 
21 1 21 2
21 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
M h M h
dM dt dt
h t h t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , 
12 1 12 2
12 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
M h M h
dM dt dt
h t h t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  and 
22 1 22 2
22 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
M h M h
dM dt dt
h t h t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . 
Using (4), it is easy to show that 0gij gjM h∂ ∂ <  and 0,gij giM h i j∂ ∂ > ≠ . We also have that 
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gij gj gij giM h M h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  which implies that the sign of 11 21g gdM dt  and 21 21g gdM dt  cannot 
be unambiguously signed although 12 21g gdM dt  and 22 21g gdM dt  are positive.  
To prove parts ii) and iii), differentiate country 2’s intermediate good supply functions 
with respect to 21gt  to obtain: 
12 1 12 2
12 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
I h I h
dI dt dt
h t h t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  and 
22 1 22 2
22 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
I h I h
dI dt dt
h t h t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . Using the results in part i) and the definition of supply 
functions in (6), we can show that the two main terms in 12gdI  have offsetting effects whose 
relative strength cannot be ascertained. From part i) and assumption 2, 1 21 2 21g g g gh t h t∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂  
and gij gj gii gjI h I h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ ; which implies 22 21g gdI dt  is unambiguously negative proving part 
iii). The proof of part ii) follows the same pattern and is omitted.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of proposition 3: The proof is quite similar to the previous ones. Let 
11,Τ
J  be a matrix 
built from the Jacobian matrix; the difference being that the first column is the first column of 
matrix T  (denoted 1Τ ) assuming 12 0gdτ = : 1 1 21 121,
2 21 22
g
g
CC a
CC a
τ
τ
−∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥−∂ ∂⎣ ⎦Τ
J . The sign of 
1 21/g gh τ∂ ∂  depends on the sign of ( ) ( )11, 22 1 21 12 2 21g ga CC a CCΤJ τ τ=− ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ .  Given that 
1 21 21 21 0g g gCC Mτ τ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ <  and  2 21 22 21 0g g gCC Mτ τ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ > , that 22 12 0a a> >  from 
Lemmas 1 and 2, and 21 21 22 21g g g gM Mτ τ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂  from assumption 2, then a reduction in 
country 2’s tariff on processed goods imported from country 1 increases the price of the primary 
good in country 1 ( 1 21/g gh τ∂ ∂ <0).  The effect on the price of the primary good in country 2 is 
determined by: 
12 21 2,
=g gh τ∂ ∂ ΤJ J ; where: ( ) ( )12, 21 1 21 11 2 21g ga CC a CCτ τ= ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ΤJ . All 
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products in the previous expression are negative and the sign of 
12,Τ
J  cannot be unambiguously 
determined without additional assumptions. However, it is easy to see that: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 21, 2, 22 21 12 11
21 21g g
CC CCsign sign a a a aτ τΤ Τ
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂− = − + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
J J <0. This shows that if an 
increase in 21gτ   induce decreases in the price of primary products in both countries, the decrease 
in country 1 will be more severe than in country 2. This proves part i). 
 
We now jump to part iv) and differentiate the bilateral export supply functions for 
primary products with respect to 21gτ  to obtain: 11 1 11 211 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
I h I h
dI d d
h h
τ ττ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ and 
21 1 21 2
21 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
I h I h
dI d d
h h
τ ττ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . From the results in part i) and equation (6) it follows 
that 11 21 0g gdI dτ < . However, even though part i) and assumption 2 jointly imply that 
2 21 1 21g g g gh hτ τ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂  and gij gj gii gjI h I h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ , the sign of 21 21g gdI dτ  cannot be 
unambiguously determined. This proves part iv).  
The output of country j’s varies with changes in its own tariff according to: 
12 1 12 2
12 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
I h I h
dI d d
h h
τ ττ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  and  
22 1 22 2
22 21 21
1 21 2 21
g g g g
g g g
g g g g
I h I h
dI d d
h h
τ ττ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . 
Using equation (6) and the inequalities 2 21 1 21g g g gh hτ τ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂  and gij gj gii gjI h I h∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ , 
we can infer that 12 21g gdI dτ <0. However, these conditions are not sufficient to unambiguously 
determine the sign of 12 21g gdI dτ . This proves parts v). The proofs for part ii) and iii) follow 
closely the previous proof and are omitted. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The international trade’s version of gravity implies that trade between two countries is proportional to their 
economic sizes respective and inversely proportional to the distance which separates them. Leamer and Levinsohn 
(1995) argue that gravity-based models have produced some of the clearest and most robust results in the economics 
science. See Eaton and Kortum (2002), Evenett and Keller (2002), and Debaere (2005) for insightful applications of 
the gravity model. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide an excellent survey of the literature. 
 
2 Notable examples include the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP, see Hertel, 1997; Keeney and Hertel, 2005), 
the AGLINK model (OECD, 2002) and the Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (UNCTAD, 2002).  
  
3 DeRosa and Gilbert (2005) investigate the predictive power of CGE and gravity type models. They find that 
“naïve” gravity model tends to over-predict intra-bloc trade expansion (especially over horizons of five years and 
less) and “naïve” CGE model tends to under-predict it.   
 
4 Abdelkhalek and Dufour (1998) propose a method to bring “statistical objectivity” in assessing the uncertainty 
about simulation results of CGE models, but their approach has not been widely used in practice. 
 
5 Rauch and Feenstra (1999) discussed these costs in a context of networks in international trade.  
 
6 The microeconomic foundations of this cost function are the following. Suppose that the production process can be 
decomposed into two different stages. First, each firm produces an aggregate output that is subsequently tailored to 
each particular market. Customizing the aggregate output leads to less (more) individual destination-specific output 
assuming that gγ  < ( )>  0.  
 
7  The link with the usual rate of subsidy 0gijκ ≥ can be recovered through 1 1gij gijs κ≡ + ≥  .  Similarly, we can 
relate the usual ad valorem tariff gijT  to the trade cost measure through ( )1 1 1gij gijt T≡ + ≤ .  An increase in gijt  
can be interpreted as a decrease in the ad valorem tariff.   
 
8 Paarlberg (1995) and Desquilbet and Guyomard (1998) find similar results when studying export subsidies on bulk 
and processed commodities in a perfectly competitive environment. 
 
9 A subsidy on domestic primary production can be viewed by trading partners as a ploy to provide a competitive 
advantage to processing firms, but such a subsidy also lowers the price of primary goods in other countries. As it 
shall be demonstrated later, lowering a tariff on primary products makes it easier to domestic processors to acquire 
foreign primary goods, but it may not necessarily confer similar benefits to processing firms in other countries.   
 
10 This argument was also verified empirically in a study by ERS (2001). They found that eliminating tariffs would 
account for most (52 percent) of the potential increase in the world price increase whereas domestic subsidies 
account 31 percent of the total agricultural price impacts of all policies. Although export subsidies can be 
decomposed as a production subsidy and consumption tax, they account for a relatively small share (13 percent) of 
the total price distortions caused by agricultural tariffs and subsidies because they are less popular.  
 
11 François and Martin (2006) examine various market access reforms and their impact on tariff escalation. For 
example the swiss formula is more effective than linear tariff cuts in reducing tariff escalation.  
